We present a model in which a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending can strategically run a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from choosing high public spending if elected, and possibly also to ensure his own reelection. We find that the incumbent never manipulates the opposition candidate's public spending if he can ensure his reelection; and that a conservative incumbent who runs a budget deficit to ensure his reelection may somewhat paradoxically choose high public spending before the election.
Introduction
It is well known that a conservative incumbent who prefers low public spending may strategically run a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from raising public spending after getting into office (Persson and Svensson, 1989) . It is however not obvious that the incumbent should target the opposition candidate if he can use the budget deficit to manipulate policy preferences of others. A conservative incumbent may alternatively target decisive voters such that they prefer his low future public spending to the opposition candidate's higher public spending. Getting reelected does after all not only allow the conservative incumbent to choose low public spending, but also ensures the perks from office for another term.
In this paper, we present a stylized two-period model to study when and how a conservative incumbent runs a budget deficit to influence the election outcome or the future public spending of a left-wing opposition candidate, respectively. In this model, voters derive utility from private consumption and public spending as well as from the charisma or other exogenous characteristics of the politician in office. The incumbent and the opposition candidate are office-as well as policy-motivated. That is, they like being in office but also care about public spending. The incumbent has weaker preferences for public spending than the median voter, while the opposition candidate's preferences are stronger.
In the first period the incumbent chooses both the level of public spending and the budget deficit. In the second period the voters (re)elect one of the two politicians. The elected politician then chooses the level of public spending and repays public debt.
We find that the incumbent can be in one of three situations, depending on how inclined the voters are to reelect him due to his charisma and other exogenous factors. First, if the voters really want him in office, then he is in the best possible situation and gets reelected after choosing his preferred policies: a balanced budget and low public spending.
Second, if the voters strongly prefer the opposition candidate, the incumbent does not get reelected no matter what policies he chooses. In this situation, he can either accept that his successor chooses high public spending and run a budget surplus to smooth private consumption over time; or he can run a budget deficit to induce his successor to keep public spending low. He runs a budget deficit if and only if he is sufficiently averse to high public spending and the opposition candidate not too enthusiastic about it.
In the third scenario, the incumbent is not reelected when choosing a balanced budget.
However if he runs a sufficiently high budget deficit, he is reelected as the median voter then prefers his low future public spending to the opposition candidate's high public spending. In this situation, the incumbent either runs a budget surplus to smooth private consumption, or a distortionary budget deficit targeted at the median voter. He does not target the opposition candidate since this would require an even more distortionary budget deficit and may not ensure his office rent. Exactly because of this office rent, even a conservative incumbent who is not overly averse to public spending may run a budget deficit to ensure his reelection. This gives rise to the somewhat paradoxical possibility that the incumbent chooses a distortionary budget deficit and high public spending before the election, and is then reelected because the voters anticipate that he will reduce public spending once the public debt that he accumulated must be settled. We discuss later how this theoretical possibility may explain, for example, why the Republican presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush used the budget deficits before their reelections not only to cut taxes, but also to raise public spending. This paper builds on the seminal contribution of Persson and Svensson (1989) . They study how a conservative incumbent can use the budget deficit to manipulate the public spending decision of a left-wing government that replaces him in office. However, they abstract from the possibility that the election outcome could depend on anticipated public spending decisions of future conservative and left-wing governments and, therefore, on the level of public debt. We extend their model by allowing the election outcome to be endogenous to the budget deficit chosen by the incumbent government.
There are other contributions extending the Persson-Svensson model to allow for endogenous election outcomes. Aghion and Bolton (1990) show that a conservative incumbent may run a budget deficit to improve his reelection prospects if and only if the median voter is afraid that the opposition candidate would default on the outstanding debt; a possibility from which we abstract. Persson Our paper further relates to contributions suggesting how distortionary policies may improve an incumbent's reelection prospects. Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) show that an incumbent who likes to channel funds to his constituency may refrain from tax reforms 1 Alesina and Tabellini (1990a) study a model in which an incumbent may run a budget deficit because he and the opposition candidate differ in their preferences for different types of public goods (rather than different levels of public spending; see also Alesina and Tabellini, 1990b) . Most other contributions on the political economy of budget deficits and public debt differ from our paper and the literature discussed so far by assuming that politicians have no policy preferences and care only about being in office (e.g., Lizzeri, 1999) , or the rents they can appropriate while in office (e.g., Battaglini and Coate, 2008 , Caballero and Yared, 2008 , and Yared, 2009 to ensure that spending decisions remain unimportant in elections. Besley and Coate (1998) present a citizen-candidate model in which the elected candidate may refrain from efficient public investments if the subsequent change in the income distribution translates into policy changes that he dislikes. Biais and Perotti (2002) show that a conservative incumbent may underprice shares when privatizing public firms to reduce the appeal of redistributive policies to the middle class. Dellis (2008) presents a model in which the incumbent may not address policy issues on which the voters like his stance before the election. In addition, an incumbent may use distortionary policies in an attempt to mislead voters who are imperfectly informed about his competence (e.g., Rogoff and Siebert, 1988) , his preferences (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman, 1990) , or the optimal level of public spending (e.g., Hodler et al., 2007) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives and discusses the equilibrium. Section 4 presents circumstantial evidence from the United States and concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
We study a two-period model with complete information in which there is a conservative incumbent R, an opposition candidate L, and a measure-one continuum of voters i that differ in their preferences for public spending. The income of the two politicians and the voters is exogenous and, for simplicity, equal to 1 in each period t ∈ {1, 2}. Observe that c and c are equal to private consumption in case of a balanced budget when public spending is g and g, respectively.
Politicians and voters derive utility from private consumption and public spending.
Their instantaneous utility function is
where α i > 0 measures the intensity of their preferences for public spending, and where u(c t ) and h(g t ) are continuous with u ′ > 0, u ′′ < 0 and h ′ > 0. We assume for technical
For simplicity, we abstract from discounting, and we introduce the tie-breaking rules that indifferent politicians act as if they preferred g to g, and indifferent voters as if they preferred R to L.
The distribution of the voters' preferences for public spending α i is given by F (α i ).
The median voter M is characterized by α M , where
. It is standard in political economy models with partisan politicians that the median voter's preferences are in-between the preferences of the two (major) parties and their candidates (e.g., Persson
and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 5). We follow this tradition and assume
Voters base their voting decisions on two different sets of factors. The first is the public spending g j 2 (b) chosen by the politicians j ∈ {R, L} if elected, and the consequences for private consumption c
The second is the bundle of the politicians' exogenous characteristics, which includes their charisma, integrity, competence and leadership skills.
5 Voter i votes for R if and only if
where θ j measures the exogenous characteristics of politician j, and γ ≥ 0 the importance of exogenous characteristics in the election. We subsequently use ∆ ≡ γ(θ R − θ L ) and simply refer to it as R's relative charisma.
Incumbent R also does not care exclusively about public spending and private consumption. He likes to stay in office and enjoys an office rent Ψ ≥ 0 if reelected. 6 If he could not stand for reelection himself, e.g. due to a binding term limit, Ψ would repre-sent his preferences for a successor from his own party rather than the opposition party (conditional on both politicians choosing the same g 2 ).
We finally impose some restrictions on α R and α L to ensure that R has strong preferences for low public spending g, and L strong preferences for high public spending g. We want to ensure that R prefers g and L prefers g in any period with a balanced budget b = 0. We moreover want that R and L have strong enough preferences for g and g,
respectively, such that neither of them would be interested in having g in one period and g in the other period even if private consumption were perfectly smoothed over time, i.e., if
. Note that such consumption smoothing would require a budget deficit
> 0 if g 1 = g and g 2 = g, and b = −b < 0 if g 1 = g and g 2 = g. We assume
This assumption implies that R's preferences for public spending are so weak that he prefers low public spending g in period two for any b ≥ −b. That is, he prefers g even if public savings are so high that private consumption raises toc + g − g > c, while it would again bec if he chose g. Similarly, we assume
Hence, L chooses high public spending g in period two for any b ≤b. That is, he prefers g even if public debt b is so high that private consumption drops toc − g + g < c, while it would again bec if he chose g.
Equilibrium
We solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of our model using backward induction.
We therefore start by looking at period two, before deriving the policy choices of the conservative incumbent R in period one.
Election outcome and public spending in period two
We first establish what level of public spending g 2 the two politicians choose if (re)elected.
For politician j ∈ {R, L}, the benefit of high public spending is u(c − b) + α j h(g), and the benefit of low public spending is
and
While H is independent of public debt b, U(b) increases in b due to the concavity of u(c t ).
If b is high, private consumption c 2 tends to be low in period two. A consumption difference of g − g > 0, which may make the difference between starving and getting by, therefore results in a large utility difference U(b). However as b decreases, c 2 tends to increase, and a consumption difference of g − g translates into a smaller utility difference U(b). For this reason, U(b) ≥ α j H is satisfied if and only if public debt b exceeds some threshold β j . This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Proposition 1 When in office in period two, R chooses low public spending g R 2 (b) = g if public debt b ≥ β R , and high public spending g The unique thresholds β R and β L increase in α R and α L , respectively, and they satisfy
Proposition 1 states that politician j ∈ {R, L} already chooses low public spending g for lower public debt b, the weaker his preferences for public spending α j are. Figure 1 illustrates that β j must be increasing in α j , as a rise in α j results in an upwards shift of α j H, such that α j H intersects U(b) at a higher b. This also explains why R already chooses g for lower public debt b than L does, i.e., why β R < β L . Proposition 1 further shows that there is a substantial difference between the two politicians' behavior in period two: R chooses g 2 = g unless there are high public savings, which need to be even higher thanb > 0; and L prefers g 2 = g even if public debt is as high as b =b.
Before the election at the beginning of period two, the voters observe public debt b (as well as g 1 and τ 1 ), and they correctly anticipate what public spending g 2 the two politicians choose if (re)elected. They anticipate that both politicians choose the same g 2 if b < β R or b ≥ β L . In this case, the voters base their decisions solely on the politicians' charisma.
They all vote for R if ∆ ≥ 0, and for L otherwise. It is easy to see that β M must be increasing in α M and decreasing in ∆. It follows from
The election can be of three possible types depending on the level of the threshold β M relative to β R and β L . If β M ≤ β R , which requires ∆ to be high, the voters reelect the 
, R is thus reelected for a larger range of levels of public debt b ∈ [β R , β L ), the higher his relative charisma ∆ is and the weaker M's preferences for public spending α M are. 
The unique threshold β M increases in α M and decreases in ∆. It holds that
Proposition 2 illustrates that our model nests the following two special cases: First, the election outcome always depends on public debt b if voters base their decisions exclusively on future public spending g 2 and private consumption c 2 (i.e. if γ = 0 such that ∆ = 0).
Second, the election outcome is exogenous and therefore independent of b if voters base their decisions exclusively on exogenous factors such as the politicians' charisma (i.e. if γ → ∞). It is this second case that Persson and Svensson (1989) study.
Budget deficit and public spending in period one
In period one the conservative incumbent R chooses public spending g 1 and the budget deficit b. He thereby takes into account how the budget deficit affects the election outcome (Proposition 2) and, if he is not reelected, his successor's public spending decision (Proposition 1).
We start by specifying what the first-best series of actions is from R's point of view:
Lemma 1 R's utility is maximized if he is reelected, and if g 1 = g 2 = g and b = 0.
Hence, R chooses a balanced budget b = 0 and low public spending g in period one if this leads to his reelection. Proposition 2 implies that these policies lead to his reelection whenever β M ≤ 0, because he is reelected for
Proposition 3 If β M ≤ 0, R chooses low public spending g 1 = g and a balanced budget
We know that β M is increasing in α M but decreasing in ∆. Proposition 3 therefore implies that R can and does get his preferred series of actions (g 1 = g 2 = g, b = 0 and his reelection) if he is relatively charismatic and if the median voter M has relatively weak preferences for public spending α M .
We next look at the case β M ≥ β L , in which the conservative incumbent R is much less charismatic than the opposition candidate L and therefore does not get reelected regardless of the budget deficit b. In this case, R has to decide whether to accept that his successor L chooses high public spending g and to run a budget surplus b ≤ 0 to smooth private consumption; or to strategically run a distortionary budget deficit b ≥ b L that induces L to choose low public spending g. Since R has relatively weak preferences for public spending,
we suppose for the moment that he chooses g 1 = g in period one (which we verify below), and we focus on his choice of the budget deficit b. The budget deficit b = −b < 0, which corresponds to a budget surplus ofb, smoothes private consumption if g 1 = g and g 2 = g. 2. If R manipulates the election outcome, the budget deficit b is lower than necessary to manipulate L's public spending g 2 .
3. If R manipulates the election outcome, he may choose high public spending g 1 = g in period one, which he never does when manipulating L's public spending g 2 . to ensure that public spending also remains low in the future. However when the election outcome depends on economic and public finance issues, the conservative incumbent runs a somewhat smaller and less distortionary budget deficit (if he runs a deficit at all). In addition to a budget deficit, he may also choose high public spending before the election.
As discussed above, this seemingly paradoxical choice follows from the interaction of various forces: The perks from office may even motivate a conservative incumbent who is not overly averse to high public spending to strategically run a distortionary budget deficit to ensure his reelection; and the necessary budget deficit may make plenty of funds available before the election, such that he may prefer to use these borrowed funds not only to finance private consumption by cutting taxes, but also to increase public spending.
In this paper, we have shown how and when a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending strategically runs a distortionary budget deficit to ensure his reelection or, if this is not possible, to manipulate the public spending decision of the left-wing opposition candidate who has stronger preferences for public spending.
Results for the reverse case of a left-wing incumbent are symmetrical. By running a sufficiently distortionary budget surplus, a left-wing incumbent can make sure that the conservative opposition candidate chooses high public spending if elected. However, the incumbent prefers to target the median voter instead to ensure his reelection. This requires a less distortionary budget surplus and guarantees the perks from office for another term.
Moreover, a left-wing incumbent may somewhat paradoxically choose low public spending before the election when running a budget surplus targeted at the median voter. The reason is that the necessary budget surplus would lead to very low private consumption if it were entirely tax financed. A left-wing incumbent who is not overly keen on a large public sector may therefore decide to finance the budget surplus partly by keeping public spending low. Nevertheless he gets reelected because the voters anticipate that he will raise public spending after the election when public savings can be consumed. Figure 2 shows the development of United States' government finances in the recent past. The model of Persson and Svensson (1989) and our model both predict that if incumbents strategically run budget deficits, we should expect the budget deficit to increase during Republican presidencies, and to decrease during Democratic presidencies. Figure 2 suggests that this has indeed happened: The budget deficit was growing during Ronald
Reagan's first term (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , and it stayed high during his second term (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and George H.W. Bush's term (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) . It was also growing during George W. Bush have raised the budget deficit to win the middle class' support in the election at the end of their first term. These high budget deficits increased the available funds by so much that any conservative incumbent who is not overly averse to public spending preferred to use these funds not only to cut taxes, but also to raise public spending. Similarly, Bill Clinton may have used the budget surplus to ensure the middle class' support in the upcoming election and may have preferred to finance this surplus not exclusively by raising revenues but also by lowering public spending because he was not overly keen on high public spending.
While our model's predictions are roughly consistent with the pattern of budget deficits and public spending in the recent US history, it is clear that this evidence is circumstantial at best, and likely that forces not captured by our stylized model also impact upon this pattern. More theoretical and empirical work seems therefore necessary to fully understand how governments can and do use public spending, budget deficits and public debt to influence election outcomes and future policies. Proof of Corollary 1: All statements directly follow from Propositions 2, 4 and 5.
